

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS LUFKIN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

\$ \$ \$

VS. § CASE NO. 9:09-CR-6

JOHN DAVID BASS, JR. a/k/a "DOBBER" §

# FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON GUILTY PLEA BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The District Court referred this matter to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for administration of a guilty plea and allocution under Rules 11 and 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Magistrate judges have the statutory authority to conduct a felony guilty plea proceeding as an "additional duty" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). *United States v. Bolivar-Munoz*, 313 F.3d 253, 255 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 123 S. Ct. 1642 (2003).

On August 13, 2009, this cause came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for entry of a guilty plea by the Defendant, on **Count I** of the charging **Indictment** filed in this cause. Count I of the Indictment charges that on or about December 30, 2008, in the Eastern District of Texas, John David Bass, Jr., a/k/a "Dobber", Defendant herein, did then and there knowingly possess a firearm, to wit: a weapon made from a Mossberg, Model 184T, 410 gauge,

single shot shotgun, bearing serial number 1115525 and having a barrel less than 16 inches in length, which was not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, § 5861(d) and § 5845(a).

Defendant, John Bass, Jr., entered a plea of guilty to Count I of the Indictment into the record at the hearing.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 the Court finds:

- a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the guilty plea in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Texas subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.
- b. That Defendant and the Government have entered into a plea agreement which was disclosed and addressed in open court, entered into the record, and placed under seal.
- c. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, and that the plea of guilty is a knowing, voluntary and freely made plea. Upon addressing the Defendant personally in open court, the Court determines that Defendant's plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats or promises. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
- d. That Defendant's knowing, voluntary and freely made plea is supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential elements of the offense and Defendant realizes that his conduct falls within the definition of the crime charged under 26

### STATEMENT OF REASONS

As factual support for Defendant's guilty plea, the Government presented the following evidence, which was admitted into the record at the plea hearing. *See Factual Resume*. The Government and the Defendant agreed that if this case were to proceed to trial, the Government would prove that Defendant is one and the same person charged in the Indictment and that the events described in Indictment occurred in the Eastern District of Texas. The Government would also prove each essential element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt through the testimony of witnesses, including expert witnesses, and through admissible exhibits.

Specifically, the Government would prove that beyond a reasonable doubt, through the sworn testimony of numerous witnesses, that the Defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed a firearm, to wit: a weapon made from a Mossberg, Model 184T, 410 gauge, single shot shotgun, bearing serial number 1115525 and having a barrel less than 16 inches in length, which was not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, § 5861(d) and § 5845(a).

The Government would present evidence establishing that on December 29, 2008, the Angelina County Sheriff's Department was contacted by the Hudson Police Department regarding a disturbance call at 503 Parks Circle in Hudson, Texas, which is in the Eastern District of Texas. When officers arrived, no one was home and the front door was open. Officers searched the house for occupants, but found no one. Officers observed firearms against the wall. Sheriff's Department Deputy Allen Hill knew that the Defendant lived at the residence

and had a felony conviction. Officers obtained a search warrant for the residence.

The Defendant was the only person present when the search warrant was executed. Officers recovered a Mossberg, Model 184T, 410 gauge, single shot shotgun, bearing serial number 1115525 and having a barrel length of 9.5 inches and a High Standard, JC Higgins brand, Model 30, .22 caliber, semi-automatic rifle, bearing no serial number. The Defendant has a felony conviction for Possession of Chemicals with Intent to Manufacture, a felony, in Cause Number F126582005, in the 420th Judicial District Court, Nacogdoches County, Texas on September 22, 2005.

Special Agent James Parker queried the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record and found that the Mossberg shotgun was not registered in the records as required.

Defendant, John David Bass, Jr., agreed with the facts set forth by the Government and signed the *Factual Resume*. Counsel for Defendant and the Government attested to Defendant's competency and capability to enter an informed plea of guilty. The Defendant agreed with the evidence presented by the Government and personally testified that he was entering his guilty plea knowingly, freely and voluntarily.

#### **RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION**

IT IS THEREFORE the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate

Judge that the District Court accept the Guilty Plea of Defendant which the undersigned

determines to be supported by an independent factual basis establishing each of the essential

elements of the offense charged in Count I of the charging Indictment on file in this criminal

proceeding. The Court also recommends that the District Court conditionally accept the plea

agreement.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, it is further recommended that, Defendant, John David Bass, Jr., be finally adjudged as guilty of the charged offense under Title 26, United States Code, Section 5861(d).

Defendant is ordered to report to the United States Probation Department for the preparation of a presentence report. At the plea hearing, the Court admonished the Defendant that the District Court may reject his plea and that the District Court can decline to sentence Defendant in accordance with the plea agreement, the federal sentencing guidelines and/or the presentence report because the sentencing guidelines are advisory in nature. The District Court may defer its decision to accept or reject the plea agreement until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3). If the Court rejects the plea agreement, the Court will advise Defendant in open court that it is not bound by the plea agreement and Defendant may have the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, dependent upon the type of the plea agreement. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B). If the plea agreement is rejected and Defendant still persists in the guilty plea, the disposition of the case may be less

<sup>1&</sup>quot;(3) Judicial Consideration of a Plea Agreement.

<sup>(</sup>A) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.

<sup>(</sup>B) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request.

<sup>(4)</sup> Accepting a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement, it must inform the defendant that to the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the agreed disposition will be included in the judgment.

<sup>(5)</sup> Rejecting a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects a plea agreement containing provisions of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court must do the following on the record and in open court (or, for good cause, in camera):

<sup>(</sup>A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;

<sup>(</sup>B) advise the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea; and

<sup>(</sup>C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated." FED. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)-(5).

favorable to Defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement. Defendant has the right to allocute before the District Court before imposition of sentence.

### **OBJECTIONS**

Within ten (10) days after receipt of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations contained within this report within ten (10) days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from *de novo* review by the District Judge of the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations, and from appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court except on grounds of plain error. *Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n.*, 79 F.3d 1415 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (*en banc*); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

SIGNED this the 14th day of August, 2009.

KEITH F. GIBLIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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